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The Political Economy and Culture of   
Human Rights in East Asia*
Michael C Davis**
The Asian values debate has been one of  the preeminent human rights debates in the 
world for the past two decades. The claim of  some East Asian regimes for continued 
authoritarian government and denial of  certain human rights on the grounds that this is 
in harmony with Asian values, helps preserve community and leads to higher growth is 
disputed in this article. This is done on the basis that liberal constitutionalism – which is 
defined here as democracy, the rule of  law and human rights – when indigenised through 
debate and adaption to local conditions is not only in keeping with traditions but, as 
the experience of  many countries in East Asia itself  reveals, is better at managing 
the diverse interests that emerge in rapidly changing societies and is thereby a generator 
of  political and economic stability. Thus, the East Asian discourse offers insights for 
human rights debates in many other developing countries globally. 
_____________________________
INTRODUCTION
The East Asian experience has long featured prominently among 
contemporary debates concerning human rights and development. 
The authoritarian East Asian challenge to human rights has juxtaposed 
human rights in opposition to Asian cultural values and related East 
Asian developmental needs. While several East Asian countries have 
defied these claims and established constitutional democracies with liberal 
human rights protections, several others, including China and other post-
communist countries in Southeast Asia, have continued to press these 
Asian values and developmental arguments to justify authoritarianism and 
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severe limits on human rights. At a time when various UN reports relate 
achievement of  the Millennium Development Goals to human rights and 
good governance,1 several newly industrialised countries in East Asia have 
led the world in economic development.2 This article will argue that full 
realisation of  the promise of  these achievements ultimately depends on 
constitutional reform that embraces democracy, human rights and the rule 
of  law. 
The East Asian experience has tended to demonstrate that constitutional 
democracy with liberal human rights protection is the regime type most 
capable of  addressing both cultural values and developmental needs. 
In the first generation of  rapidly developing countries in East Asia, 
constitutionalism ultimately worked better in constructing the conditions 
for coping with the diverse interests that emerged in rapidly changing 
societies. While an East Asian brand of  authoritarianism, with strong 
commitments to good governance, worked reasonably well at managing 
early-stage development, liberal constitutionalism, with strong human 
rights and rule of  law commitments, is thought to have provided better tools 
for consolidating these achievements at the high-end stage of  economic 
and political development. In this analysis liberal constitutionalism is 
understood to include three core components: democratic elections with 
multiparty contestation; human rights, including freedom of  expression; 
and the rule of  law with firm adherence to principles of  legality.3 To these 
core components I add indigenisation as a fourth ingredient. Indigenisation 
is the local institutional embodiment that connects constitutional 
government to the local condition.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the human rights 
debate in East Asia has tended to be situated in domestic constitutional 
debates. This defies a pattern evident in those parts of  the world with 
multilateral regional human rights regimes. In most regions of  the world, 
regional human rights treaties and supporting institutions have provided 
the tools for importing human rights standards vertically from regional 
transnational practice. The East Asian importation of  rights, in contrast, 
has tended to be a process of  horizontal or comparative importation of  
1  Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc A/59/2005 
(21 March 2005) (‘2005 UN Report’); Report of  the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004) United Nations, www.un.org/secureworld at 18 
August 2007 (‘2004 UN Report’).  See also Kofi Annan, ‘In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN’ (2005) 
84 Foreign Affairs 63.
2 See United Nations,Millennium Development Goals Report 2007 (2007) United Nations, http://www.
un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/mdg2007.pdf  at 18 August 2008.
3  Michael C Davis, ‘The Price of  Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian Economic Development’ (1998) 20 
Human Rights Quarterly 303; Michael C Davis, ‘Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate Over Human 
Rights and Asian Values’ (1997) 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal 109.
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international human rights standards through domestic constitutional 
debates and interpretations. These human rights debates have especially 
engaged concerns with Asian cultural values and economic development, 
making the so-called ‘Asian values debate’ one of  the pre-eminent human 
rights debates in the world. The cultural dimension often involves local 
movements to promote democratisation, human rights and the rule of  
law in the face of  Asian cultural relativist claims. The economic dimension 
engages the contest between authoritarian economic development and 
liberal democratic reform as competing avenues to economic success. 
Through these locally grounded debates, countries in East Asia engage 
familiar international concerns with civil and political rights and economic 
and social rights, but do so on distinctly local terms. An authoritarian regime 
might claim that it provides a more stable environment for development 
and better protection of  local cultural and social values. Local democrats 
and outside critics may contest this, saying that liberal political freedom, 
a free press, the rule of  law and democratic rights best allow a country to 
address these developmental and cultural issues. Arguing for civil liberties 
in the context of  development becomes an argument not only for civil 
liberties but also for better protection of  a wide range of  economic and 
social rights, including such familiar rights as better education, safe working 
conditions, a good environment, adequate health care and the like. The 
human rights debate is connected to the debate over political and economic 
stability. While human rights specialists may be more comfortable with an 
approach that is centred on the international human rights regime, this 
approach based on domestic constitutionalism may offer more immediate 
dividends in developmental terms by being better connected to the local 
condition. I believe it is precisely this strengthening of  the domestic human 
rights debate fostered under East Asian conditions that offers something 
of  interest to a world trying to deal with human rights concerns in many 
developmental contexts.
While the East Asian debate and the region would certainly benefit from 
the development of  regional and national human rights institutions, human 
rights advocacy has to date been fundamentally grounded in domestic 
constitutional practice.4 This article considers in three parts: first, the 
various claims on behalf  of  authoritarianism made in the name of  Asian 
4  Efforts to reach a regional consensus on human rights have gone on for many years. Most famously, as 
part of  the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights process, governments across the entire Asian region 
reached a consensus on the Bangkok Declaration, which was rather sensitive to Asian cultural and sovereignty 
concerns: http://law.hku.hk/lawgovtsociety/Bangkok%20Declaration.htm at 18 August 2008. The Bangkok 
Declaration was not converted into an Asian regional human rights charter. More recently ASEAN members 
have signed an ASEAN Charter, which is essentially a constitution for the ASEAN grouping that was adopted at 
the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007: http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdfat 18 August 2008. 
The ASEAN Charter effectively removes the ASEAN non-interference policy and calls for the creation of  an 
ASEAN Human Rights Body for ASEAN members only, making it the first Asian regional human rights treaty 
that, once fully ratified, will legally obligate members to respect human rights. 
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cultural values; second, authoritarian and competing East Asian claims 
relating to economic development; and third, the role of  human rights and 
constitutionalism in addressing these issues. The aim is to look beneath the 
surface of  this East Asian debate to better appreciate its contribution to 
human rights protection.
THE ASIAN VALUES CULTURAL DEBATE
The central challenge to human rights in East Asia has come from the 
so-called Asian values cultural debate. It is therefore useful to consider 
several prominent authoritarian-based East Asian arguments made on 
behalf  of  cultural values, including: first, the specific Asian values claims 
on a substantive level; second, a related cultural prerequisites argument 
which seeks to disqualify some societies from realisation of  democracy 
and human rights; and third, claims made on behalf  of  community or 
communitarian values in the East Asian context. In introducing these 
Asian values arguments I will offer a critique of  each, thereby rebutting 
the claim that human rights and democracy are culturally unsuited to Asian 
soil.
First, considering Confucian political values as the dominant value system 
in East Asia, the main substantive claim is that Asian values are illiberal 
and anti-democratic, rendering a liberal democratic human rights regime 
unsuited to the Asian cultural condition. East Asian societies are said to 
favour authority over liberty, the group over the individual, duties over 
rights and such values as harmony, cooperation, order and respect for 
hierarchy.5 East Asian supporters of  authoritarianism have therefore argued 
that their societies are unsuited to democracy and Western liberal human 
rights practices. Those authoritarian leaders are usually the promoters of  
these Asian values claims raises suspicion and have spawned a number of  
challenges to these Asian values claims. 
The most obvious challenge is a simple empirical one: in recent decades 
the most successful Asian countries have generally moved on to adopt 
liberal democratic human rights regimes. The rapid recent development 
and consolidation of  democracy and human rights in several East Asian 
societies speaks for itself. Former authoritarian systems, including those in 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia all underwent 
democratic transitions and human rights reform in the last decades of  
the twentieth century. Hong Kong, Thailand, Mongolia and Malaysia 
have likewise seriously engaged the democracy and human rights debates 
5  Samuel P Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, in L Diamond and M F Platner (eds) The Global Resurgence 
of  Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1993) 3, 15.
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through constitutional reform, though obstacles remain. While each of  
these systems has continued to be plagued with the lingering residue of  
their authoritarian past, the reformist direction is empirically evident and 
is indicative of  a serious attraction to democracy and human rights in East 
Asian societies. 
Beyond the challenge offered by developments on the ground, activists 
and analysts have offered a direct intellectual challenge to the Asian values 
claim, especially attacking its historical and philosophical roots. Chinese 
scholars of  the Confucian classics have noted that Confucianism does 
not embrace unquestioning acceptance of  autocratic rule; that it shares 
with liberalism a commitment to higher norms.6 Confucian scholar Wejen 
Chang has especially pointed out the prominent position of  the golden rule 
in Confucian ethics.7 Chang argues that the harsh autocratic practices of  
traditional Chinese rulers, sometimes known as neo-Confucianism, were 
more a structural imperative of  dynastic rule and a product of  Chinese 
legalism than they were of  traditional Confucian thought. 
Other scholars have challenged the motives of  those who advance the 
above noted stereotypes concerning Asian values. Edward Said long ago 
accused Western societies of  ‘orientalism’, of  offering up a conception of  
Asia as ‘the other’ in order to justify Western dominance.8 More recently 
Asian scholars have noted the tendency of  East Asian leaders and scholars 
to adopt orientalism as a self-defining discourse.9 In this latter conception 
of  orientalism, East Asian exceptionalism replaced Western imperialism as 
the aim of  Asian values discourse. 
A related attack on the importation of  Western human rights values is to 
argue that Asians in the early modern period simply did not understand 
the liberal Western institutions they were importing. So even when they 
attempted to import Western human rights values, the strong pull of  
Asian culture lead them to reinterpret such Western concepts in Asian 
terms, surely marking Asian culture as unsuited to such importation. Such 
Asian reinterpretation saw democracy and related human rights as merely 
good government and social welfare, comparable to the Chinese minben 
(people as a basis) tradition.10 There is no doubt that authoritarian-minded 
6 Victoria T Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005).
7 Wejen Chang, ‘The Individual and the Authorities in Traditional Chinese Legal Thought’ (Paper presented 
for the Constitutionalism and China Workshop, Columbia University, 24 February 1995). Chang emphasized the 
Confucian admonition that people should treat others the way they wanted to be treated.
8  Edward Said, Orientalism (Vintage Books, New York, 1979).
9 Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (Routledge, London, 1995).
10  Andrew J Nathan, ‘Political Rights in Chinese Constitutions’ in R R Edwards, L Henkin, and A J Nathan 
(eds) Human Rights in Contemporary China (Columbia University Press, New York, 1986) 77.
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misinterpretations did occur and that Chinese nationalists, following the 
May 4th Movement, would sometimes distort Western liberal concepts.11 
But recent studies of  early modern Chinese writings demonstrate that 
Chinese intellectuals often had a good grasp of  leading Western liberal 
thinkers.12 Accordingly, this argument may simply exaggerate the claimed 
distortions and the limitations imposed by cultural values.
Much of  what is done today in the name of  Asian values can be explained 
more often than not by expediency. This expediency is often accompanied 
by other ideological constructs, such as Marxism, that have little to do 
with Asian traditions. Francis Fukuyama points out that the only neo-
Confucian authoritarian system evident in recent East Asian experience 
was the government of  pre-war Japan.13
A second line of  Asian values argument, of  more contemporary relevance, 
claims that societies which lack certain cultural prerequisites are not suited 
for democracy and human rights. These claims are rooted in earlier studies 
that sought to measure the degree of  civic culture that existed in Western 
democracies.14 This is a categorically different kind of  attack than the above 
culture-based arguments because of  its basis in social scientific democratic 
theory. Though such a theory did not aim to support cultural relativist 
arguments, it was converted into such a challenge in East Asian application. 
As pointed out by Elizabeth Perry, in comparative studies of  political 
development and democratisation this hopeful line of  reasoning became 
burdened with the pessimistic view that societies that lacked civic culture 
were not likely to be successful at democratisation.15 It was as if  societies 
had to pass a test for democracy. This lent further support for authoritarian 
Asian values reasoning. Did societies burdened with authoritarian Asian 
values offer poor soil for democracy and the concomitant values associated 
with human rights and the rule of  law? 
The tautological reasoning in this line of  argument is apparent. To 
expect a society to develop democratic culture without democracy itself 
a questionable proposition. Many societies in East Asia in fact proceeded 
with democratisation, with or without the allegedly required civic culture. 
With democratic institutions in place the emphasis then shifted to 
11  The May Fourth Movement was triggered by the decision of  the Versailles Conference on May 4, 1919 that 
the German concession in Shantung was to be transferred to Japan. This caused a political movement marked 
by Chinese nationalism and disillusionment with both the West and Chinese tradition.  The ideological struggle 
between socialism and liberal democracy that would later become so important was born here.
12  Marina Svensson, The Chinese Conception of  Human Rights, The Debate on Human Rights in China, 1898 – 1949 
(Department of  East Asian Languages, Lund, 1996).
13 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Confucianism and Democracy’ (1995) 6 Journal of  Democracy 20.
14  Gabriel A Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Sage 
Publications, Newbury Park, 2nded, 1989).
15  Elizabeth Perry, ‘Introduction: Chinese Political Culture Revisited’ in J Wasserstrom and E Perry (eds) 
Popular Protest and Political Culture in China (Westview Press, Boulder, 1994) 1.
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consolidation and further constitutional development.16 Political elites and 
academics in East Asia have nevertheless clung tenaciously to this claim 
concerning prerequisites.17 The on-going task of  documenting civic culture 
in East Asia contributes to a mind-set that does appear to conceive of  a 
test for democratisation. This has spawned a persistent argument by those 
in some communities that the local society is not yet ready for democracy 
and its related liberal human rights institutions.18
A third more consciously intended cultural relativist argument, and one 
that is to some extent more credible, is the community-based thesis. This 
argument fails to justify the denial of  democracy and human rights, but 
it does raise some concerns that must be addressed by societies hoping 
to better secure human rights. For convenience here I divide community-
based arguments into three categories: romanticisation of  community, civic 
virtue and communitarianism. Romanticisation of  traditional communities 
is a common theme in many modernising societies. The Vietnamese village 
has been described as “anchored to the soil at the dawn of  History ... 
behind its bamboo hedge, the anonymous and unseizable retreat where 
the national spirit is concentrated”, while the Russian mir was to “save 
Russians from the “abhorrent changes being wrought in the West by 
individualism and industrialisation.”19 One may doubt just how liberating 
traditional village life was. Many in East Asia have migrated to the cities 
when they have had the chance. Few in East Asia’s diverse urban societies 
still have the option of  pursuing a traditional village lifestyle.
The second community-based argument relates to civic virtue. In East 
Asia, this argument has ancient roots and is most often associated with 
Confucianism. Authoritarian leaders and even some academics in the 
region argue that it is still of  great contemporary relevance.20 In this view, an 
emphasis on civic virtue, more than liberal institutions, is seen as the key to 
good government.21 Even in the West, an emphasis on civic virtue has been 
a persistent theme throughout the modern period of  democratisation.22 But 
many democratic founders have not been confident of  the persistence of  
civic virtue and have sought to craft a democracy that, in James Madison’s 
terms, is safe for the unvirtuous.23 The earlier founding debate in the 
16 Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, ‘Toward Consolidated Democracies’ (1996) 7 Journal of  Democracy 14.
17 Perry, above n 15.
18 See Davis, above n 3 (1997).
19  Samuel Popkin, ‘The Political Economy of  Peasant Society’ in J Elster (ed) Rational Choice, (Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1986) 197.
20 See Daniel Bell and Chaibong Hahm (eds) Confucianism for the Modern World (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003).
21  Daniel Bell (ed) Confucian Political Ethics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007).
22  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Vintage Books, New York, 1945).
23  Robert D Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1993).
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Czech Republic between Vaclav Havel, the anti-Communist idealist who 
emphasised civic virtue, and Vaclav Clause, the pragmatic post-communist 
politician who was more concerned with interest representation, is likely 
to be rehearsed in post-communist and post-authoritarian East Asia.24 As 
has been true in other parts of  the world, civic virtue alone will not likely 
be enough; nor will its persistence be reliable. While Asian philosophies 
such as Confucianism have often emphasised virtuous rule, Asian leaders, 
especially in the modern era, have seldom lived up to this standard, as high 
levels of  corruption and tyranny have often prevailed.
A third community-based claim, which I label simply as communitarianism, 
offers the centrality of  community as an alternative to liberal individualism. 
Communitarianism is the most challenging contemporary discourse about 
community. In simple terms, Western communitarianism has tended to 
emphasise the common good over liberal individual rights and to emphasize 
the shared values of  community. In this respect, communitarianism in the 
West has primarily offered a critique of  liberalism. It also encompasses the 
civic virtue ethical components already discussed. There is, however, a wide 
gap between Western communitarianism and the more prominent forms 
of  East Asian communitarian practice. While Western communitarians are 
apt to see community as a venue for democratic discourse and liberation, 
the conservative brand of  communitarianism officially promoted in 
Singapore, and to some extent in China, is hardly a venue for democracy 
and liberation.25 In East Asia, communitarian rhetoric has generally come 
with authoritarian government. Authoritarian East Asian regimes may 
seek to implant a value system that emphasises passive acceptance of  the 
regime’s dictates. Western communitarians, on the other hand, have often 
felt the need to commit to some liberal values to preserve their discourse 
and overcome some less acceptable values associated with traditional 
communities.26 The Asian conservative variety of communitarianism 
has resisted increased demands for liberalisation. Those committed to 
addressing communitarian concerns may face the need to deploy some 
liberal institutions in ways that are responsive to these concerns or 
challenges.
24 Aleksander Smolar, ‘From Opposition to Atomization’ (1996) 7 Journal of  Democracy 24.
25 Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (Routledge, London, 1995).
26  The so-called liberal-communitarian debate has become a central debate in contemporary political 
philosophy: C F Delaney (ed) The Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
Lanham, 1994).
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THE EAST ASIAN ‘ECONOMIC MIRACLE’ AND THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The East Asian authoritarian developmental model has functioned as the 
other branch of  the ‘Asian values’ debate. For human rights scholars, this is 
the part of  the debate that may indirectly incorporate social and economic 
rights in its promise of  rapid and stable economic development. Although 
it is really a political economy argument and not about cultural values, it 
has often been subsumed under the Asian values debate because of  its 
relationship to the political strategies of  authoritarian regimes in the area. 
As with the cultural claim, this political economy claim for authoritarian 
development has represented a powerful East Asian challenge to universal 
human rights. First chronicled in a 1992 World Bank report as the ‘East 
Asian miracle’,27 the developmental achievement of  the first generation of  
newly industrialised countries in East Asia was fairly evident in the rapid 
economic growth of  the 1970s and 1980s. It has since been evident in 
the 1990s and the new millennium in the economic growth of  the second 
generation of  East Asian rapid developers.28
The East Asian authoritarian developmental model first took shape 
in Japan, whose development model was said to combine soft political 
authoritarianism with economic liberalisation in a planned capitalist 
economy. Under this model, economic guidance was offered by an 
autonomous bureaucracy led by the Japanese Ministry of  International 
Trade and Industry (‘MITI’).29 In his 1982 book, Chalmers Johnson 
emphasised the importance of  a developmentally oriented elite, organised 
under a tripartite coalition, composed of  the dominant Liberal Democratic 
Party, the bureaucracy, and big business.30 Johnson differentiates between 
a ‘market-rational’ (regulatory) and a ‘plan-rational’ (developmental) 
capitalist system.31
The Japanese model, with varied modifications, was seized upon as the 
paradigm for East Asian economic development. In non-Japanese hands 
this model would involve much higher levels of  authoritarian autocratic rule 
27 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (World Bank, Washington DC, 1992).
28 See Paul Krugman, ‘The Myth of  Asia’s Miracle’ (1994) 73 Foreign Affairs 62.
29 See Chalmers Johnson , MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of  Industrial Policy 1925-1975 (Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1982) 
30 Ibid 51 – 2. With substantial state capacity these three worked together to ensure the coherent targeting 
of  certain industries for production of  exports under a system of  Export Led Growth (‘ELG’): see Chalmers 
Johnson, ‘Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan’ in F C Deyo (ed) The Political Economy of  the New Asian Industrialism (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1987) 136. ELG is distinguished from an Import Substitution Industrialization (‘ISI’) strategy, 
which aims to substitute local goods for imports, though both usually coexist.
31 Johnson, above n 29, 19.  A ‘plan-rational’ system will be marked by bureaucratic disputes and factional 
infighting while a ‘market-rational’ system will tend toward parliamentary contest: ibid 22 – 3. 
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with related constraints on democracy and human rights, thus making it a 
central feature in the East Asian human rights debate.32 Throughout East 
Asia authoritarian economic developmental success often offered an excuse 
for resisting liberal democratic constitutional change and international 
human rights standards. Such repression was deemed necessary for such 
regimes to stay in power and maintain their achievements. 
This use of  the Japanese model as a basis for denying democracy and human 
rights is paradoxical. For all of  its soft authoritarian tendencies, Japan was 
actually a democracy, though a democracy with long-established one-party 
electoral dominance. Notwithstanding Johnson’s soft authoritarianism 
characterisations, by 1982 Japan had enjoyed for decades a degree of  
democracy, with a functioning electoral process, a moderately free press, 
multiple political parties and independent courts. As a democracy Japan 
also offered a paradigm for the brand of  illiberal democracy with less 
robust constitutional and human rights institutions that often followed the 
overthrow of  authoritarianism in the region. 
The Japanese economic crisis of  the 1990s called into question Japan’s 
developmental model. It also served to highlight the inadequacies of  
the Japanese brand of  democracy in assertively coming to grips with 
Japan’s continuing economic problems.33 A system based on a tradition of  
bureaucratic planning appears to have difficulty producing politicians and 
institutions willing to take political responsibility. It has also produced a 
rather conservative judiciary with weak protection of  human rights.34
The difficulties that other East Asian economies encountered in the late-
1990s East Asian financial crisis demonstrated similar political limitations 
in other East Asian emergent democracies. In spite of  these limitations, 
the authoritarian developmental model has persisted as a model for the 
second generation of  East Asian developers, including China and the 
post-Communist emerging developmental states in Southeast Asia. This 
authoritarian model remains a major challenge to human rights in the 
region.
32 Atul Kohli traces the role that Japanese colonialism played in facilitating this model. Atul Kohli, ‘Where 
do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of  Korea’s “Developmental State”’ 
in M Woo-Cumings (ed) The Developmental State (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1999) 93. See Robert Wade, 
Government and the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of  Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of  Growth in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990).
33  William H Overholt, ‘Japan’s Economy, at War With Itself ’ (2002) 81 Foreign Affairs 134.
34  Michael K Young, ‘Judicial Review of  Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual 
Dispute Resolution in Japan’ (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 923; Christopher A Ford, ‘The Indigenization of  
Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience’ (1996) 28 Case Western Reserve Journal of  International Law 3.
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This authoritarian developmental challenge in East Asia raises the question 
whether authoritarianism with suppression of  opposition and low levels 
of  human rights protection will persist as a viable model in the region. 
The historical experience of  the first generation developers suggests this 
is unlikely. With economic success the authoritarian developmental state 
may become its own grave-digger.35 The circumstances that seem to have 
been favourable to authoritarian development are more likely to be present 
in the early stages of  development. At an early stage, proper economic 
policy may sometimes be more important for achieving economic growth 
than regime type.36 But at a later stage, political challenges may arise as 
workers and other subordinate classes demand a greater say in public 
affairs through protection of  civil liberties and greater security for a range 
of  basic social and economic rights.37
Several tendencies may operate at once. As economic elites become globally 
more competitive they may become less compliant and more corrupt. 
They may seek official assistance in insuring a compliant labour force, in 
securing loans and in otherwise gaining business-friendly policy. To better 
guard their privileges, they may resist political reform that may undercut 
their influence or capacity to get things done. David Kang describes 
the transformation of  corruption under the East Asian developmental 
paradigm from a top-down predatory state with a weak business sector 
under early authoritarianism to a strong business sector with bottom-up 
rent-seeking vis-à-vis a fractured state in the early democratic period, both 
involving large amounts of  corruption.38 Corruption may also become a 
substitute for dysfunctional government institutions. 
Both corruption and the overloading of  government institutions tend 
to retard the protection of  human rights. With increased wealth and 
35 See William W Grimes, Unmaking the Japanese Miracle, Macroeconomic Politics, 1985 – 2000  (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 2001); Meredith Woo-Cumings, ‘The State, Democracy, and the Reform of  the Corporate Sector 
in Korea’ in T J Pempel (ed) The Politics of  the Asian Financial Crisis (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996) 116; 
Gregory W Noble and John Ravenhill, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Korea, Taiwan and the Asian Financial 
Crisis’ in G W Noble and J Ravenhill, The Asian Financial Crisis and the Architecture of  Global Finance (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2000) 80.
36 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, ‘Political Regimes and Economic Growth’ (1993) 7 Journal of  
Economic Perspectives (1993) 51. They conclude ‘that social scientists know surprisingly little: our guess is that 
political institutions do matter for growth, but thinking in terms of  regimes does not seem to capture the 
relevant differences’. 
37  In defining economic development, in addition to the GDP, economists have paid attention to a range 
of  social welfare indicators such as education, health, gender equality, life expectancy, working conditions, 
infrastructure and so forth: see Amartya Sen,‘Development: Which Way Now?’ in K P Jameson and Charles K 
Wilbur (eds) The Political Economy of  Development and Underdevelopment (McGraw Hill College, New York, 1996) 7; 
United Nations Human Development Report 2002.
38 See David C Kang, ‘Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State in South Korea’ 
(2002) 56 International Organization 177, 182.  Rent-seeking is understood as ‘attempts by individuals to increase 
their personal wealth while at the same time making a negative contribution to the net wealth of  their community’: 
Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge University Pres, New York, 1990) 279.
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education in the society, ordinary citizens may become resistant to elite 
monopolization of  power and demand greater transparency, participation 
and accountability. This requires political and legal institutional reforms, 
both of  which are instrumental to human rights protection. Because 
of  these developments, the trend of  the 1990s in the East Asian newly 
industrialised countries (‘NICs’) was toward both political and legal reform 
and toward integration into world markets. 
Unfortunately, as the economic crisis served to illustrate, even with 
democratisation or substantial reforms the problems of  corruption and 
political overload often persisted. Post-authoritarian regimes failed to 
reform adequately as they attempted to maintain historical strategies of  
developmental success. Political reformers, such as Japan and South Korea, 
in the 1990s clung to developmental economic policies of  interference 
in market decisions, even while pursuing political reform.39 The second-
generation developers have sought to exclude political reform entirely, 
with great implications for human rights. China’s economic success 
without substantial political reform has spawned questions about whether 
China will somehow defy gravity and not follow its economic success with 
political reform and liberalisation.40 China, one of  the newest entries in 
the East Asian developmental achievement, has to date pursued policies 
of  economic liberalisation and legal reform without fundamental civil 
and political rights.41 This has required suppression of  dissent in general 
and particularly harsh containment of  the public protests that have arisen 
over the denial or basic educational, health, labour and social rights. 
Many post-communist Southeast Asian countries in the early stages of  
economic development likewise cling to similar authoritarian repressive 
strategies with only limited legal reforms.42 The difficulty with arguments 
for authoritarianism with law or other confidence-building institutions is 
that maintenance of  such guarantees ultimately may require the security of  
a liberal democratic regime that fosters transparency, public accountability 
and human rights.43
The issue is not whether the East Asian brand of  authoritarian 
39 Overholt, above n 33.
40 Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of  Developmental Autocracy (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006).
41  Dali L Yang, ‘China in 2001, Economic Liberalization and Its Political Discontents’ (2002) 42 Asian Survey 
14. According to a 2002 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, China is 
experiencing the same economic difficulties as the earlier class of  ‘economic miracle’ states, including high levels 
of  corruption and large problems with bad loans, economic displacement and slow-down. OECD, China in the 
World Economy: The Domestic Policy Challenges. (OECD, Paris, 2002).
42  Andrew Maclntyre, ‘Institution and Investors: The Politics of  the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia’ (2002) 
55 International Organization 81. 
43 See Jon Elster, ‘Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea’ (1993) 71 
Public Administration 169, 199 – 201. Elster notes that the strength of  the dictator is also his weakness:  ‘He is 
unable to make himself  unable to interfere with the legal system whenever it seems expedient’: ibid.
60 Jindal Journal of  International Affairs / Vol. 1
developmentalism worked – it certainly brought about rapid economic 
development. The question is what political and institutional change will be 
required as the developmental process goes forward. The state institutions 
that are favourable to economic development in a free market system are 
generally believed to be those that afford the degree of  order, reliability, 
transparency and participation sufficient to inspire confidence and thereby 
encourage entrepreneurial activity and investment.44 State institutions with a 
higher degree of  autonomy and transparency may better resist rent-seeking 
demands and secure open channels for the protection of  basic rights. For a 
democracy this requires a sufficiently stable institutional base so that there 
are neither too many nor too few institutional actors with sufficient power 
over the decision-making process to either engage in excessive rent-seeking 
or interfere with efficient public decisions.45 Both fighting corruption and 
attracting investment appear to require an institutional base that affords 
a balance of  public decision-making autonomy and accountability. The 
kinds of  institutions that generally are thought to achieve these objectives 
relate to maintenance of  democracy, human rights and the rule of  law, the 
ingredients of  modern constitutionalism.46
CONNECTING DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
Theorists commonly use two approaches to connect liberal constitutional 
democracy and development. They may focus on the statistical correlation 
between democracy and development, or they may trace the causal 
mechanisms in the development context that lead to increased demands 
for democratic representation, rights and legality. The first approach may 
address both the survivability of  democracy under various economic 
circumstances and the role of  democracy in encouraging economic 
development or dealing with economic crises or shocks. The second 
approach is concerned with the causal mechanisms by which economic 
development contributes to democratisation, highlighting the ways in 
which such democratisation may be responsive to developmental needs. 
Regarding statistical correlation, Adam Przeworski and others used 
worldwide statistics to gauge the survivability of  democracies from 1950 
to 1990.47 Such statistics demonstrated a strong correlation between 
wealth and the survivability of  democracy, and gave no support for using 
44 See Mancur Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’ (1993) 87 American Political Science Review 
567, 572.
45 Kang, above n 38, 182; MacIntyre, above n 42.
46  Kang, above n 38, 182
47 See Adam Przeworski et al, ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’ (1996) 7 Journal of  Democracy 39.
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dictatorships to achieve development and democracy.48 Gerald Scully, 
surveying 115 countries from 1960 to 1980, reversed the dependent 
variable to consider the effect of  democratic institutions on the economy.49 
Scully notes that open societies with human rights, the rule of  law, private 
property, and market allocation grew at three times the rate and were two 
and one-half  times as efficient as societies in which the exercise of  related 
rights was largely proscribed.
When it comes to the special circumstances of  dealing with economic 
crisis or shock, Dani Rodrik finds further that democracy offers more 
favourable results. Rodrik argues that shock will tend to be worse in 
societies with deep latent conflicts and that democracy affords the ultimate 
institutions of  conflict management.50 This argument is supported by 
Donald Emmerson, who argues that in the financial crisis, affected East 
Asian countries with high levels of  political freedom were generally more 
resilient.51 A democracy such as Taiwan fared better during the height of  
the crisis and democracies caught by the crisis, such as South Korea and 
Thailand, bounced back more quickly. Authoritarian China also fared 
much better, as its financial institutions were largely protected from global 
currency markets in what began as a currency crisis.
Considering the second approach, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and others 
argue that quantitative correlative studies reach the right conclusion, 
but fail to offer a reason.52 They urge that the case for liberal democracy 
becomes compelling at a certain stage in the industrialisation process 
because industrialisation transforms society in a fashion that empowers 
subordinate classes and makes it difficult to exclude them politically.53 The 
subordinate classes, especially the working class, have the greatest interest 
in democracy and its related rights protections, while the bourgeoisie have 
every incentive to roll back or restrict democracy.54 Democracy affords 
institutions that can deal with diverse interests and the resultant conflicts 
that emerge. 
48 Ibid 44–49.
49 Greald W Scully, Constitutional Environments and Economic Growth (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992) 
12 – 14, 183–184.
50 See Dani Rodrik, ‘Democracy and Economic Performance’ (Paper presented at the Conference on 
Democratization and Economic Reform in South Africa, 16 – 19 January 1998.)
51  He contrasts the relatively strong recovery of  Thailand and South Korea with Indonesia: Donald 
Emmerson,‘Americanizing Asia? (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs 46, 52. See also, Stephan Haggard, ‘The Politics of  the 
Asian Financial Crisis’ (2000) 11 Journal of  Democracy 130; Mark Baird, ‘An economy in the balance’, International 
Herald Tribune (New York), 19 September 2002, 6.
52 Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al, Capitalist Development and Democracy (University of  Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1992).
53 Ibid 1.
54 Ibid 7 – 8, 50, 57 – 8.  “Capitalist development furthers the growth of  civil society—by increasing the level 
of  urbanization, by bringing workers together in factories, by improving the means of  communication and 
transportation, by raising the level of  literacy”: Ibid 6. 
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The path to the demise of  the South Korean dictatorship bears a striking 
resemblance to Rueschemeyer and colleagues’ predictions.55 Authoritarian 
leadership in South Korea was built on collusion between the military, the 
political leadership, and the large chaebol (local multinational corporations 
(‘MNCs’).56 The success of  development policies under such a narrow 
coalition brought out a new class force in the 1980s under the banner of  
the minjung (the masses) movement.57 The Park and Chun regimes’ earlier 
policies of  economic liberalisation without political liberalisation brought 
on the demise of  the regime. At the end of  1997, after South Korea’s 
financial collapse, the ruling party, rooted in the past authoritarian regime, 
was pushed out with the election of  opposition leader Kim Dae-jung as 
president.58 Backroom deals within the elite ruling coalition – what was 
then called crony capitalism – no longer inspired confidence. As David 
Kang highlights, both the late authoritarian period and the early democratic 
period were characterised by high levels of  corruption.59 South Korea was 
pushed to complete the reform process, to dismantle the developmental 
economic model that had persisted under democratisation.60 This required 
South Korea to clean up the conglomerates by instituting systems of  
oversight and putting loans and other financial decisions on a more sound 
financial footing. This was added to the earlier efforts at political reform, 
instituting single terms for the president, a formally acceptable system of  
constitutional judicial review and greater rights protection through less 
strict control over the media and public organisations.
Taiwan, a textbook case of  the East Asian miracle, appeared to follow a 
similar pattern. With economic success, increasing calls for democratisation 
were made in the 1980s. With pressure from below, a confident regime 
embraced the reform process in a top-down pattern. Along with 
democratic elections, the previously moribund systems of  the rule of  law 
and judicial review began to take on life. Taiwan fared much better than 
most East Asian countries in the early phase of  the economic crisis, though 
it later showed signs of  economic and political weakness associated with 
continued tension with China. 
55 See Hagen Koo and Eun Mee Kim, ‘The Developmental State and Capital Accumulation in South Korea’ in 
R P Appelbaum and J Henderson (eds)State and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim (Sage, Newbury Park, 1992) 
121 – 49. See also Rueschemeyer, above n 52.
56 See Koo and Kim, above n 55, 144 – 5. This ruling coalition was decidedly narrower in South Korea than 
in the post-war Japanese prototype. It did not include the larger base of  a popular well-organized political party 
and employed much more repressive policies. 
57 Ibid145.
58  See Kate Wiltrout, ‘Kim Leads Knife-edge Korea Poll’, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 19 December 
1997, 1. This change of  direction apparently received a further vote of  confidence in late 2002, with the election 
of  an even more liberal candidate from the same party, President Roh Moo Hyun. Weon-ho Lee and Sung-
hoBaik, ‘Generation 2030 Bursts Onstage’, International Herald Tribune, (New York), 30 December 2002, 7.
59 See Kang, above n 38.
60 Ibid;MacIntyre, above n 42.
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China is the next great East Asian challenge. China’s recent policies of  
economic reform resemble the earlier authoritarian South Korean policies 
under Park Chung Hee (1963-79) of  economic liberalisation without 
political liberalisation, accompanied by harsh human rights policies 
that aim to repress dissent.61 Like South Korea, China has reached the 
current developmental juncture with very large industries and substantial 
numbers of  industrial workers at risk in the reform process. Numerous 
worker-based demonstrations have highlighted these failures to meet 
basic needs. China’s entry into WTO has further pushed China towards 
a more competitive posture. To accomplish this there was a need to 
reduce government interventions in the economy and develop regulatory 
regimes.62 Ultimately, if  the other East Asian examples are instructive, this 
will require constitutional reform, including democratic reform, human 
rights and the rule of  law, though the question of  timing seems uncertain.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
In the absence of  regional human rights institutions, domestic 
constitutionalism has become the primary vehicle in East Asia for 
implementing human rights commitments. This may be supplemented 
by national human rights institutions.63 Constitutionalism has offered a 
venue to respond to the various claims underlying the cultural values and 
developmental debates in East Asia, a response to authoritarianism. The 
concept of  constitutionalism advanced herein, as noted above, includes the 
fundamental elements of  democracy, human rights and the rule of  law and 
elements of  local institutional embodiment – what I call indigenisation. 
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century constitutionalism has 
become one of  the primary vehicles for universalising human rights. 
Constitutionalism serves both as a conduit for shared international and 
local human rights and political values and the embodiment of  those 
values. It provides the context in which the subordinate classes can 
voice their basic concerns relating to both civil and political rights and 
to economic and social rights. In this regard, this section emphasises two 
aspects of  the constitutional equation in East Asia: first, the empowering 
61  One should be cautious about this comparison. While the state-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’) do encompass 
the heavy industry sector in China, there are other reforming sectors where the trend is toward dispersal, rather 
than concentration, of  economic activity. The historical Chinese emphasis on workers’ rights may also serve as 
a counterweight, though workers have so far taken a bruising in the reform era.
62 See OECD, above n 41. The OECD report points out, ‘Government interference leads to poor SOE 
management and inefficient operations, which foster low profits and high debt; this in turn makes it more 
difficult to restructure to improve efficiency and prompts government interventions that spread the problem by 
extracting resources from stronger enterprises to prop up those that are failing’: ibid 16. 
63 See Brian Burdekin, National Human Rights Institutions in Asia (Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, Leiden, 2007).
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role of  constitutionalism, in contrast to the usual view that emphasises 
only constraint; and second, indigenisation of  constitutionalism, as an 
avenue to hook it up to the local condition. 
A.   The Empowering Role of  Constitutionalism and Human Rights
Theorists have worried that constitutionalists place too much emphasis on 
constraint, always using language of  “checking, restraining or blocking.”64 
The notion of  voluntary constraint is a questionable proposition in a world 
where leaders frequently override constraint in the interest of  expediency.65 
This may result in what Guillermo O’Donnell calls “a ceasaristic 
plebiscitarian executive that once elected sees itself  as empowered to 
govern the country as it deems fit.”66 Such an executive may effectively 
become an elected dictator and become more concerned about retaining 
power than protecting human rights. Too much emphasis on constraint 
may cause constitutionalists to overlook the important empowering aspects 
of  constitutionalism. The notions of  constraint under constitutional 
government take meaning and force only through popular empowerment. 
Under constitutional government the processes of  empowerment extend 
beyond the institutions of  electoral politics to include the institutions of  
human rights and the rule of  law. It is the integration of  political and legal 
institutions in the processes of  constitutional government that allows both 
empowerment and constraint to work. 
East Asia has in recent years experienced the phenomenon of  the powerful 
state and the hazard of  unconstrained government, elected or otherwise. 
The most notorious East Asian examples where elected leaders used 
their mandate to pervert the constitutional order were some of  the early 
South Korean experiments with democracy and the Marcos regime in the 
Philippines.67 As noted above, theorists have responded with two nearly 
opposing alternatives, often applied paradoxically to the same regimes. 
Some have advocated instituting the rule of  law and rights protection along 
64  Stephen Holmes, ‘Precommitment and the Paradox of  Democracy’ in J Elster and R Slagstad (eds) 
Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988) 195, 226.
65  Jon Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process’ (1995) 45 Duke Law Journal364; 
Linz and Stepan, above n 16, 19.
66  Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Illusions About Consolidation’ (1996) 7 Journal of  Democracy 34, 44.
67  Jang Jip Choi, ‘Political Cleavages in South Korea’ in Hagen Koo (ed) State and Society in Contemporary Korea 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993) 13; S Guingona, ‘The Constitution of  the Philippines: An Overview’ 
(1989) 65 New Zealand Law Journal 419.
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with authoritarianism.68 The difficulty with this option is in inducing such 
authoritarian leaders to consistently accept such constraint and respect 
human rights. There have been some aspirations toward this notion in 
Singapore, Malaysia and (until recently) Indonesia. 
Alternatively, some may advocate instituting democracy but replacing 
liberal constraints with alleged East Asian cultural constraints and 
communitarian processes of  bargaining to establish a so-called illiberal 
democracy.69 Paradoxically this approach may be the aspirational basis of  
the claims to democracy made by the same regimes in Singapore, Malaysia 
and Suharto’s Indonesia. But an alleged democracy that prohibits or 
suppresses opposition without core constitutional constraints does not 
appear to be democracy at all. A system that places emphasis on social 
connections and networking may lead to particularism and clientelism.70 
This situation is difficult to distinguish from authoritarianism when it 
comes to the potential for abuse of  power and neglect of  human rights.
Extra-constitutional action should more properly be understood as not 
just overriding constraint but as overriding democracy and its concomitant 
guarantees of  human rights and the rule of  law. Such extra-constitutional 
action does not just ‘get the job done’ but, in fact, deprives the people 
of  democratic power. To deprive people of  freedom of  speech does not 
just serve to eliminate meddlesome critics and achieve order but, may in 
fact, disempower the people in securing basic human rights, both political 
and economic. Constitutionalists should seek to engender discourse and 
empowerment. The legal and human rights institutions of  constitutional 
government are enfranchising in nature; they work to engage the citizens in 
a political conversation about popular concerns and values. Contrary to the 
Asian values claim, in a modern complex society this is the contemporary 
venue for values and development discourse. This is what has inspired 
the Asian movement to constitutionalism. If  constitutionalism is openly 
68 Shuhe Li and PengLian, ‘On Market Preserving Authoritarianism: An Institutional Analysis of  Growth 
Miracles’ (Conference paper presented at the Chinese University of  Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 8 March 
1996). This argument picks up some general support in Giovanni Sartori’s proposition that ‘demo-protection’ 
(protection from tyranny or constitutional constraint) travels better than ‘demo-power’ (implementation of  
popular rule) – ‘nobody wants to be imprisoned, tortured or killed’: Giovanni Sartori, ‘How Far Can Free 
Government Travel?’ (1995) 6 Journal of  Democracy 101, 101 – 4.Sartori would not advocate that the absence of  
demo-power be accepted as a long-term solution.
69  Some scholars have advocated an Asian model of  democracy along these lines, characterizing it as illiberal 
democracy: see, for example, Daniel A Bell, David Brown, Kanishky Jayasuriya and David Martin Jones, 
Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, (Macmillan Press, London 1995); Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of  Illiberal 
Democracy,’ (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 22. 
70  In East Asia such clientelism has spawned economic and political systems that are particularly noted 
for problems of  cronyism and corruption, problems that are frequently associated with East Asia’s leading 
countries, for example, Indonesia, South Korea China and Japan: Richard H Mitchell, Political Bribery in Japan 
(University of  Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1996).
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accepted as the venue for political choice, rather than merely constraint, 
then the ensuing discourse within this venue may engender respect for its 
important constraints and processes. 
To better understand this claim we must consider the constitutive process. 
This process can be considered at two levels: constitution-making and 
constitutional implementation. Constitution-making is where the explicit 
constitutional conversation begins. A constitutional assembly is a powerful 
venue for discourse about basic political and human rights values. This is 
especially true due to the fact that such assemblies usually are called on the 
heels of  a national crisis, which is inherently engaging. In recent decades 
the East Asian landscape has been riddled with constitution-making 
exercises. In the 1980s and 1990s constitution-making in the Philippines 
and Hong Kong offered prominent, seemingly successful examples.71 In 
such constitution-making processes Jon Elster describes a venue where 
passion, interest and reason operate.72 There are both upstream and 
downstream constraints, as well as processes for consensus building and 
broadening bases of  support.73 Upstream constraints consider political 
settlements and may also protect members of  the former regime. For 
the Hong Kong Basic Law, as with the post-war Japanese Constitution, 
the upstream constraints were dictated by outside powers.74 Downstream 
constraints look to ratification or acceptance. In the Philippines, after the 
‘People Power’ revolution, downstream acceptance was the substantial 
constraint.
After a constitutional founding, successful implementation of  constitutional 
government depends on appreciation of  the discursive architecture 
embodied in the notion of  checks and balances. Most appreciated in this 
regard is the positive discursive machinery of  constitutional judicial review, 
the power whereby courts review laws enacted by the elected branches of  
government for conformity to constitutional requirements. Constitutional 
judicial review has become the premier institution for securing human 
rights in East Asia.75 Constitutional judicial review serves as the engine 
for the basic constitutional conversation about political values and 
commitments.76 This constitutional conversation proceeds as legislatures 
71 See Guingona, above n 67; Michael C Davis, ‘Constitutionalism and the Rule of  Law in Hong Kong’ (2006) 
3 Loyola University of  Chicago International Law Review 165.
72 See Elster, above n 65, 377 – 86.
73 Ibid 374.
74 See Ford, above n 34; Michael C Davis, “Human Rights and the Founding of  the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region: A Framework for Analysis’ (1996) 34 Columbia Journal of  Transnational Law 301.
75  Mauro Cappelletti, ‘The “Mighty Problem” of  Judicial Review and the Contribution of  Comparative 
Analysis’ (1980) 53 Southern California Law Review 401.
76  Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, The Supreme Court at the Bar of  Politics (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 2nd ed, 1986).
2011 / Political Economy and Culture of  Human Rights  67
pass laws and courts respond and legislatures pass new laws.77 While much 
of  East Asia has adopted Western civil and common law legal systems, 
only the democratic or quasi-democratic countries of  the region have fully 
functioning systems of  constitutional judicial review.78 These countries 
include Japan, the Philippines and Hong Kong, with such power vested in 
the ordinary courts, and Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, Indonesia, and 
until recently Thailand, where civil law special constitutional courts are 
employed.79 For the authoritarian regimes of  the region, no or little judicial 
review power is the norm. In an authoritarian environment it is unlikely 
that judges can be counted on to carry out such role assertively. Using a 
rational choice model, in the context of  democratic constitution-making 
and implementation, Tom Ginsburg has traced the reasoning of  both 
constitutional drafters and courts in creating or developing constitutional 
judicial review.80 While one may question whether a narrow rational choice 
model can fully account for the decisions of  actors whose interests and 
identity are mutually constituted as the process unfolds, it is clear that 
authoritarian regimes will have little commitment to such constitutional 
practices.81
Constitutional judicial review of  legislative enactments is not the sole 
discursive engine for crafting state-based solutions to broader societal 
concerns. At moments of  crisis – what Stephen Krasner calls punctuated 
equilibrium – the entire people may be mobilised to civic action or intense 
reflection on political value concerns of  fundamental importance.82 
In normal times the people may be content with representation and 
constitutional judicial review, while they largely focus on private affairs; 
77  A court can use various avoidance and interpretation doctrines, what Bickel calls ‘passive virtues’ to carry 
on a complex dialogue with the elected branches of  government and the people: Bickel, above n 76, 23, 65 – 70, 
117.
78  As a general proposition the structure of  constitutional judicial review is divided into those systems with a 
central constitutional court deciding issues on referral from ordinary courts or other branches of  government 
(usually civil law systems) and those decentralized systems where ordinary courts exercise this power in actual 
cases (usually common law systems): Mauro Cappelletti, above n 75, 401. Japan is the East Asian exception 
where a decentralized system exists in a civil law country. Hong Kong has both systems operating at once: a 
decentralized system for matters within local autonomy and a centralized review process by the National People’s 
Congress (‘NPC’) Standing Committee in Beijing (advised by a Basic Law Committee) on matters of  central 
authority or involving local central relations. Hong Kong Basic Law, Arts 17 and 158.See Randall Peerenboom (ed) 
Asian Discourses of  Rule of  Law, Theories and Implementation of  Rule of  Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the 
US (Routledge, New York, 2004).
79 See Ford, above n 34; Davis, above n74; C Neal Tate, ‘The Judicialization of  Politics in the Philipines and 
Southeast Asia’ (1994) 15 International Political Science Review 187.
80  Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies, Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2003) The rational choice model Ginsburg employs assumes that judges, public officials 
and constitution drafters will act in their narrow self-interest, typically in ways that aim to advance their power 
within the system.
81  Michael C Davis, ‘Constitutionalism and New Democracies’ (2004) 36 George Washington International Law 
Review 681.
82  Stephen D Krasner, ‘Approaches to the State, Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’ (1984) 26 
Comparative Politics 223.
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while at times of  what Bruce Ackerman calls constitutional politics, the 
level of  civic action may become extraordinary.83 There is evidence of  
such mobilization in the recent South Korean and Japanese constitutional 
politics of  reform and resistance to corruption. Considerable civic action 
also accompanied the post-1987 constitutional reforms in Taiwan and the 
financial crisis and overthrow of  Suharto in Indonesia.84
B.    Indigenisation of  Constitutionalism and Human Rights
With a firm commitment to the constitutional fundamentals in place a 
premier concern is that constitutionalism, with its democracy, human 
rights and rule of  law ingredients, plant its roots firmly in the local soil. 
Aung Sang Suu Kyi argues that as long as there is a genuine commitment to 
modern democratic values, there is room for variation in local institutional 
embodiment.85 It is through local institutional embodiment – what I 
call indigenisation – that constitutionalism responds to the above noted 
concerns with values and development. For indigenous institutions to 
work, however, the constitutional fundamentals of  democracy, human 
rights and the rule of  law must be in place. Otherwise, authoritarian 
leaders may implant a hegemonic discourse constructive of  authoritarian 
power and destructive of  genuine community values. Local institutional 
embodiment may include traditional organisations and practices and more 
contemporary institutions responsive to developmental concerns. In this 
subsection I consider the ways in which constitutionalism and its related 
human rights institutions in East Asia have responded to both the cultural 
concerns raised in the Asian values debate and to developmental concerns 
likely to arise in post-authoritarian constitutional democracies.
Constitutionalists should consider the ways in which local culture and 
traditions may facilitate constitutional discourse under the umbrella of  the 
core constitutional commitments discussed above. It is in local institutional 
embodiment that substantive communitarian concerns can be addressed. 
Local grass roots and minority representation may be achieved through 
contemporary institutions which secure autonomy or minority rights, or 
through recognition of  traditional ethnic or religious groups. The aim is 
for a realistic discourse that is anchored in the community but responsive 
83  Bruce Ackerman, We The People (The Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1991) 34 – 57.
84  The 1987 lifting of  martial law in Taiwan triggered popular demonstrations, a judicial review opinion 
ruling the failure to hold new elections for the Legislative Yuan to replace seats long held by mainlanders 
elected in the 1940s unconstitutional, a National Affairs Conference and ultimately full democratic elections: 
Jaushieh (Joseph) Wu, Taiwan’s Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1995) 125 – 37. Indonesia experienced high levels of  civic action and fundamental constitutional reform: see 
Maclntyre, above n 42.
85 Aung San Suu Kyi, ‘Transending the Clash of  Cultures, Freedom, Development and Human Worth’ (1995) 
6 Journal of  Democracy 11, 13.
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to the contemporary urban and industrial or post-industrial conditions. 
Locally sensitive representation may include attention to the usual 
geographic political institutional options such as federalism or autonomy, 
as well as consideration of  various electoral models that seem likely to 
increase representation of  minorities. Other forms of  representation may 
include substantive or symbolic recognition of  distinct ethnic, religious 
or linguistic communities in which traditional leaders assume leadership 
roles. It may include a continuing role, symbolic or substantive, for 
traditional monarchs, such as is evident in contemporary Malaysia, Japan 
and Thailand.86 Special minority group rights may be combined with 
individual rights; in East Asia there are many traditional indigenous groups 
or distinctive communities who are promised varied degrees of  autonomy 
in the local constitutional system. However, East Asian governments, wary 
about outside intervention in their sovereign territory, may be reluctant to 
allow the type of  international recognition such autonomous communities 
usually covet as security for the autonomy arrangement.87 As a rare 
exception, China has allowed the security of  the internationally recognised 
status for Hong Kong under the Hong Kong Basic Law, as allowed under 
Article 31 of  the Chinese Constitution.88
Arend Lijphart has described the effort by elites to overcome the 
destabilising effect of  cultural fragmentation in Europe as consociational 
democracy.89 The democratic element is important. A bargain across 
cleavage lines that only includes the elite strata would be merely authoritarian 
oligarchy and would not likely secure a channel for engaging popular will. 
The use of  various forms of  local institutional embodiment, along with 
core constitutional commitments, may engender more confidence in the 
system, encourage local connectedness to the constitutional order and 
facilitate genuine values discourse.
Beyond political representation, legal structures may also address important 
indigenous human rights concerns. This may include the application of  
religious or tribal laws and the provision for genuine autonomy for national 
or ethnic minority groups. For such autonomy arrangements to work, 
86 Abdulahi An-Na’im, ‘Islam, Islamic Law and the Dilemma of  Cultural Legitimacy for Universal Human 
Rights’ in C E Welch and V A Leary (eds) Asian Perspectives on Human Rights (Westview Press, Boulder, 1991) 31; 
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democratic commitments and basic rights must be emphasised. Traditional 
practices can be renovated or new institutions invented to sustain important 
indigenous rights while maintaining core constitutional commitments. For 
example, in societies with long traditions of  citizen petition of  leaders, 
a mechanism for petitioning elected officials could be employed or, 
perhaps, a modern version thereof, the ombudsman.90 Even a traditional 
monarch, who may retain symbolic and ceremonial functions, may take on 
an ombudsman-like role in a post monarchical democratic society.91 Such 
tradition-bound institutions may open better avenues of  communication 
and protection in ways consistent with historical experience. 
Even when contemporary institutions are employed, in practice they 
may be expected to take on indigenous characteristics. Contemporary 
institutions such as human rights tribunals or commissions, election 
commissions or corruption fighting bodies may be employed to address 
those contemporary problems that neither the core constitutional nor 
traditional institutions adequately respond to. The goal in all cases is 
orderly processes of  discursive engagement or empowerment. 
Hegemonic claims of  adherence to Asian values without a commitment 
to the core constitutional and human rights fundamentals are unlikely to 
engender a healthy values discourse or contribute to long-term public 
trust. One might contrast the constitutional paths of  modern Japan and 
China.92 While these countries bare comparison due to similar traditional 
values, striking differences are in many ways explainable structurally 
by their contrasting post-war constitutional paths. While post-war 
Japan has taken a liberal constitutional path, there has been substantial 
indigenisation in practice. Indigenisation has even transformed the 
practice of  constitutional judicial review, as the courts are noted for a 
conservative system of  constitutional guidance.93 Though conservative, 
this system has afforded increased rights protection and does seem to take 
constitutionalism seriously.94 Even efforts at reforming the system of  one-
party dominance have been cautious, engendering renewed public concern 
with corruption.95
90  Hong Kong stands out as a system that makes use of  an official ombudsman as an avenue of  public 
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Without liberal constitutional fundamentals, China has advanced a 
hegemonic view concerning the constitutional fundamentals of  democracy, 
human rights and the rule of  law, which people challenge at their peril.96 
Constitutional judicial review is not allowed. Minority rights are poorly 
protected in a top-down system of  control. The constitution provides 
for top-down legislative supervision by people’s congresses, which are 
themselves not subject to competitive elections and are dominated by 
the central government. Even greater central control is achieved through 
the Chinese Communist Party. If  review occurs at all it is either through 
informal guidance or through committee or party oversight in the passage 
of  laws.97 A collectivist notion of  rights subjecting the rights of  the 
individual to the interests of  the state appears to undermine local rights 
protections.98 The Public Security Bureau and the military take a central 
role in providing public security, often at the expense of  basic rights. 
Economic reforms have engendered increased diversification of  interests 
for which inadequate representation is secured. This neglect is especially 
pronounced for minority groups, some of  which are looked upon with 
great suspicion. Commitments to legality, under the theory of  rule by 
law, are shaky at best, encouraging increased corruption as the economic 
reform process goes forward. This has produced a values-vacuum, which 
the society is hard placed to deal with. Efforts to open up democratic 
and legal channels for representation of  diverse and minority interests are 
often met by government indifference. Opening up appropriate legal and 
democratic channels will not automatically solve the current problems but 
such moves may offer hope for crafting orderly solutions in the future.
Many of  the same indigenisation arguments addressed in relation to cultural 
values have obvious connections, as well, to economic developmental 
concerns. Recognition of  distinct cultural groups clearly has market 
and developmental implications; as such groups address their distinct 
developmental problems and attract investment in various resources.99 
Beyond multiculturalism, economic developmental concerns implicate a 
wide range of  local social and economic rights. 
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CONCLUSION
This argument has emphasised several points: first, that the Asian values and 
other cultural arguments do not justify the choice of  authoritarianism and 
the neglect of  democracy and human rights; second, that under East Asia’s 
current condition of  substantial economic development, an authoritarian 
regime can no longer be adequately responsive to diverse developmental 
concerns; third, the positive role of  constitutionalism in constructing 
empowering conversations in modern democratic development and as a 
venue for values and developmental discourse; and fourth, the importance, 
especially in cross-cultural and developmental contexts, of  indigenisation 
of  constitutionalism through local institutional embodiment. In the absence 
of  the development of  regional human rights institutions, in East Asia it 
has been the linkage of  these points that has connected the constitutional 
regime of  a given state or similar territorial community to the international 
processes of  human rights and has established the importance of  domestic 
human rights practices.
